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tax collector and the heirs or legatees of the deceased, when the
court determines that a larger tax is due than that admitted to
be due. In all probability, the trial court had this authority
already,22 but the amended section provides needed authority
to permit the inheritance tax collector to pay his experts the
fees awarded by the court as soon as they are paid to him by
the heirs of legatees.2
On the recommendation of the Law Institute, two articles
of the Civil Code were expressly repealed in 1962.24 The repeal
of Article 398 of the Civil Code, which should have been effected
at the time the new procedural Code was adopted, 25 was some-
what tardily accomplished. The reasons for the repeal of Article
1369 of the Civil Code have been given above. 26
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL LAW
Services Included in "Anything of Value"
Act 68 broadens the definition of "anything of value" in Ar-
ticle 2 of the Criminal Code' specifically to include services, by
adding the phrase "and including transportation, telephone or
telegraph service, or any other service available for hire," to the
first sentence of that definition. The added language removes
any doubt as to the propriety of prosecuting variously executed
telephone service frauds as theft. It would also embrace the ob-
taining of filling station services by means of fraudulently used
credit cards. The "credit card" fraud situation and other fraud-
ulent devices used to obtain services clearly come within the gen-
22. Under LA. R.S. 13:3666 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 114, § 1.
23. LA. R.S. 47:2423 (Supp. 1962), added by La. Acts 1962, No. 114, § 2.
24. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 398, 1369 (1870) were expressly repealed by La. Acts
1962, No. 70.
25. Id. art. 398, required the curator of an interdict to advertise the judgment
of interdiction three times within a month of its rendition. This requirement did
not mesh with the new schedule of judicial advertisements adopted by LA. R.S.
43:203 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 34, § 2, and La. Acts 1961,
No. 26, § 1, and it was both unnecessary to, and in conflict with, the new rules
adopted by LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4552 (1960).
26. See text accompanying notes 13, 14, supra.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:2(2) (Supp. 1962).
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eral theft2 crime, since they constitute taking "by means of
fraudulent conduct practices or representations"; and the 1962
amendment of the definition of Article 2 removes all doubt 3 as to
whether the services obtained constituted "anything of value"
under the Criminal Code.
Armed Robbery Penalty Increased
Armed robbery is a serious crime and the maximum penalty
of thirty years is quite appropriate; but there may be some ques-
tion as to the wisdom of the harsh provisions of Act 475,4 which
impose a minimum sentence of five years and completely deny
probation. Thus, a convicted defendant, even though he is a
first offender who has been led into the crime by others, must
be sentenced to Angola for at least five years. A further pro-
vision of Act 4755 denies any parole consideration until the first
offender has served one-third of his sentence.
Narcotics Penalties
The punishment pendulum swung the other way when Act 80
relaxed, in first-offender "possession" cases, the severe penalty
clause of the narcotics law.6 Drastic penalties serve a useful pur-
pose as a deterrent to this highly commercialized and repre-
hensible crime; but the general denial of probation or parole to
those found guilty of "possession" was, in the case of youthful or
first offenders, unduly harsh. Too often, such offenders are
themselves victims of this vicious racket and are more deserving
of help than punishment. Help will be possible, in proper cases,
under Act 80. Clause (4) of the narcotics penalty clause is
amended to permit probation and parole if the defendant con-
victed of possession is a first narcotics offender. A clause (5)
is added, which specially provides that the youthful (under
twenty-one) offender shall be subject to a lessened penalty of
"imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than
2. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
3. "Anything of value" is defined as having the "broadest possible construc-
tion, including any conceivable thing of the slightest value, movable or immovable,
corporeal or incorporeal." This language was probably broad enough, without
amendment, to cover telephone or filling station services. See State v. Norris, 242
La. 1070, 141 So. 2d 368 (1962), in which the obtaining of services by fraudulent
use of a credit card was treated as theft. However, the Norris case did not square-
ly raise the issue and some district attorneys had been hesitant to file theft
charges based upon the fraudulent obtaining of services.
4. Amending LA. R.S. 14:64 (1950).
5. Adding a Clause G to LA. R.S. 15:574.3 (1950).
6. LA. R.S. 40:98.1 (Supp. 1962).
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ten years"; and this type of offense does not carry the general
narcotics case prohibition of probation or parole. These amend-
ments will give the sentencing judge a much-needed authority so
to frame his sentences as to promote rehabilitation of first and
youthful offenders.
Simple Kidnapping Extended
The offense of simple kidnapping is extended by Act 344 to
cover the parent who, after a Louisiana court has awarded cus-
tody of his or her child to another, takes or entices the child out
of the state in an effort to defeat the custody order.7 This added
simple kidnapping clause is limited to removing the child "from
the state," and requires proof of a specific "intent to defeat the
jurisdiction" of the court awarding the child's custody to another
person.
Theft of Dogs
The 1950 "cattle theft" law8 served no useful purpose, since
stealing of domesticated animals is fully and adequately covered
by the general theft article of the 1942 Criminal Code.9 There is
also little need for the special "theft of dogs" crime created by
Act 290. In State v. Chambers" the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that a dog was the subject of larceny; and the reasons as-
signed in Chambers would be equally applicable to a prosecution
for theft under Article 67 of the 1942 Criminal Code.
Aggravated Crime Against Nature
The maximum five-year penalty for crime against nature"
provided an entirely adequate penalty for the case where two
sexually perverted adults voluntarily committed crime against
nature. In this situation the maximum sentence was seldom im-
7. Id. 14:45(4).
8. LA. R.S. 14:67.1 (1950).
9. LA. R.S. 14:67.2 (Supp. 1962). The penalty clause of new Article 67.2B
is confusingly stated, providing a heavier fine but lesser prison sentence for second
and subsequent offenses.
10. 194 La. 1042, 195 So. 532 (1940), discussed in The Work of the Loui8iana
Supreme Court for the 1939-1940 Term -Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 LA. L.
REV. 379, 389 (1941). Cf. State v. Moresi, 209 La. 180, 24 So. 2d 370 (1945),
holding that the killing of an unregistered dog was authorized by La. Acts 1918,
No. 239. This decision would not preclude a theft prosecution for the stealing ofan unregistered dog, for even contraband articles may be the subject of theft. State
v. Donovan, 108 Wash. 276, 183 Pac. 127 (1919). PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
861 (1957).
11. LA. R.S. 14:89 (1950).
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posed for the offense is more a violation of the public sense of
decency than a major crime.12 On the other hand, where force
is employed in having unnatural sex relations with an unwilling
partner, or the other party to the relations is a juvenile, the five-
year maximum term may be insufficient. It is to meet the latter
situations that Act 60 defined and provided a possible maximum
penalty of fifteen years for "aggravated crime against nature."
This maximum penalty was decided upon after a study of the
statutes of twenty-five states, most of which provided for maxi-
mum penalties ranging from ten years to life imprisonment. The
special circumstances which characterize aggravated crime
against nature look to force employed, age of the victim, dis-
parity in ages of the offender and the victim, and mental in-
capacity of the victim.
Clauses (1) and (2) follow the pattern of the aggravated
rape article of the Criminal Code, 13 in placing emphasis upon the
use of force or aggression in effecting the act.1 4
Clauses (3) and (4) generally conform with the simple rape
article of the Criminal Code,' 5 covering the situation where the
other party is of unsound mind or rendered incapable of a valid
consent by stupor produced by drugs. It should be noted that
drunkenness is not included in Clause (4).
Cases in which the aggravating circumstance is the imma-
ture age of the other party bring Clause (5) into operation only
if the other person (victim) is under the age of seventeen years
and the offender is at least three years older than the victim.
Clause (5) is aimed at the situation in which an adult leads a
juvenile into abnormal sexual behavior that is likely to pre-
cipitate a fixed pattern of sexual maladjustment. 6
Hit-and-Run Hunting
The sound and humane principle of the hit-and-run driving
12. See A.L.I. Model Penal Code § 207.5(4) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), which
treats consensual sodomy between two adults as a misdemeanor.
13. LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950).
14. This factor is also emphasized in A.L.I. Model Penal Code § 207.5(1) (a)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) ; N.Y. Penal Law § 690 (McKinney 1950).
15. LA. R.S. 14:43(1), (3) (1950).
16. "Gross Imposition" by deviate sexual conduct is defined in the Model Penal
Code to include the situation where "the victim is less than 18 years old, and the
actor is at least 5 years older than the victim, but it shall be a defense under this
paragraph if the actor proves that the victim had previously engaged promiscu-
ously in deviate sexual intercourse." Model Penal Code § 207.5(2) (d) (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
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laW1 7 is applied to hunting accidents by Act 446, which imposes
a maximum fine of $500 upon a hunter who, after knowingly
injuring another, "either abandons such person or fails to ren-
der to such person all necessary aid possible under the circum-
stances." The writer's only criticism of the law is its failure to
follow the hit and run driver law pattern completely by authoriz-
ing a prison sentence for such a callous disregard of human
decency.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Venue
Act 76 is drafted in conformity with Articles 1 and 2 of the
tentative Jurisdiction and Venue Title of the Louisiana State
Law Institute's projet (now in preparation) for a revision of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. It amends Article 13 of the 1928
Code of Criminal Procedure' to facilitate the determination of
venue for the prosecution of crimes, parts of which have oc-
curred in several parishes, or where the exact place of the crime
is difficult to determine with certainty.
Article 13 had been amended in 1942, to provide that a multi-
parish offense might be tried "in any parish where a substantial
element of the crime has been committed." (Emphasis added.)
While the 1942 amendment had materially helped with the venue
problem, there was often considerable difficulty in determining
whether certain acts of the defendant constituted a "substantial
element" of the offense.19 The new "act or element" formula is
more flexible; but it is still qualified by the requirement that
the act in the parish of the trial must be an act "constituting"
the offense.
Paragraph B is based on Sections 239, 245, and 246 of the
American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure (1931).
It provides a workable venue rule for crimes committed on public
17. LA. R.S. 14:100 (1950).
18. Id. 15:13.
19. See State v. Pollard, 215 La. 655, 41 So. 2d 465 (1949), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term - Criminal Law
and Procedure, 10 LA. L. REV. 198, 207 (1950). In Pollard a contractor was
prosecuted in the parish where the work was done and false records were pre-
pared for fraudulently obtaining money for purported road work. In reversing the
conviction on the ground of improper venue, the supreme court stressed the fact
that no substantial element of the crime occurred in the parish where the prosecu-
tion was brought. That parish, which had a very vital interest in the prosecution,
would probably be proper venue under the broadened "act or element" formula
of amended Article 13A.
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conveyances, such as trains, airplanes, and boats, under circum-
stances where the exact locus of the offense cannot be deter-
mined with any degree of certainty. In this situation the venue
may be laid in any parish through which the vehicle passed and
in which "the crime could have been committed." (Emphasis
added.)
One distinction should be noted between the scope of Para-
graph A and that of Paragraph B. Paragraph A applies to inter-
state jurisdiction, as well as venue between parishes. It covers
cases where some of the acts or elements of the crime may have
occurred in another state. Paragraph B governs only venue be-
tween parishes, where the offense is committed on a "vehicle
while in transit in this state and the exact place of the offense
in this state cannot be established." (Emphasis added.)
Constitutionality of the liberal venue provisions of amended
Article 13 is assured by an amendment of Section 9 of Article I
of the Louisiana Constitution. 20
Bail Law Revised
Act 411 will be of special interest to surety companies and
other bail bondsmen. It adds to Article 86 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure 21 a provision for a three-year cut-off date on the
obligation of the bail bondsmen in felony cases and a two-year
limitation on the bail undertaking in misdemeanor cases. These
time limitations are qualified by the proviso that the defendant
must have furnished other bail or have been formally sur-
rendered in open court or the parish jail at the expiration of the
stated cut-off period.
Act 411 excludes surety companies from certain bail bond
limitations which are of significance where personal sureties are
given. Article 89,22 which authorizes the court to reject a surety
who is already acting as surety on another bond pending in the
court, is limited to personal sureties by an express proviso ex-
cepting surety companies. The declaration of financial respon-
sibility, required by Article 103,23 is likewise limited to personal
sureties; and the court is required to accept any bail bond fur-
20. Amend. No. 8. The amendment may not have been necessary in order to
validate Paragraph A. See State v. Coon, 242 La. 1019, 141 So. 2d 350 (1962).
21. LA. R.S. 15:86 (1950).
22. Id. 15:89.
23. Id. 15:103.
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nished by a duly authorized surety company. Article 107,24 pro-
viding for forfeiture and collection of bonds for appearances be-
fore city or juvenile courts or for preliminary examinations, is
modified to eliminate the recordation requirement when the
bondsman is a surety company.
In 195825 the nonforfeiture situations set forth in Article 109
were amended to embrace cases where the defendant was pre-
vented from appearing because he was detained in jail or a peni-
tentiary in another jurisdiction, or because he was in the Armed
Services. Article 109 is further amended by Act 411 to provide
for setting aside a judgment of forfeiture within sixty days on
proof that the defendant's non-appearance resulted from the
types of detention recognized in that article.
Article 11026 is amended to authorize the discharge of a judg-
ment of forfeiture if the defendant is surrendered, in prison or
in open court, within sixty days after the rendition of the judg-
ment. Discharge of the judgment of forfeiture upon subsequent
surrender of the defendant is a justifiable relaxation of the lia-
bility imposed on the surety, but the surety should bear the costs
incurred in the forfeiture proceedings. This is not specified in
the amendment, but such assessment of costs should be within
the court's general authority in setting aside the judgment.
PUBLIC LAW
Melvin G. Dackin*
STATE REGULATION OF BUSINESS - THE NEW "MILK AUDIT" LAW
The last legislative session took another long step towards
complete regulation of the fluid milk and ice cream and ice cream
substitutes industry. The Orderly Milk Marketing Act, which
was enacted in 1958 to provide minimum prices to producers and
to proscribe sales below cost and other "disruptive sales prac-
tices,"' was amended in 1962 to provide for the fixing of mini-
mum and maximum prices at which "milk, milk products and
24. Id. 15:107.
25. Id. 15:109 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 191.
26. LA. R.S. 15:110 (Supp. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 40:940.1-940.15 (Supp. 1958).
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